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JEOPARDY - Ex POST FACTO - The Supreme Court of the United
States held that a Kansas statute providing for civil commitment of
persons convicted of a sexually violent offense after release from
prison does not violate substantive due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment and does not invoke the protection
afforded criminal defendants under the Constitution's Double
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997)

In November 1984, Leroy Hendricks ("Hendricks") fondled two
thirteen-year-old boys and later pled guilty to taking "indecent
liberties"' with the boys.2 The Sedgwick County, Kansas District
Court convicted and sentenced Hendricks to serve between five
and twenty years in prison.3 In August 1994, shortly before his
scheduled release to a halfway house, Kansas petitioned the state
district court to place Hendricks under civil confinement pursuant
to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act ("Act"). 4 Hendricks
moved to dismiss the petition, alleging, among other things, that
1. Kansas defines "indecent liberties" as:
(1) Any lewd fondling or touching of the person of either the child or the offender,
done or submitted to with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of
either the child or the offender, or both; or
(2) soliciting the child to engage in any lewd fondling or touching of the person of
another with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the child, the
offender or another.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3503 (1996).
2. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (1997). Hendricks was charged with three
counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. He pled guilty to two counts and in
exchange, the State dropped one count and agreed not to seek penalties under the Habitual
Criminal Act (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504 (1996)). Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d
129, 130 (Kan. 1996).
3.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
4.
Id. at 2077. The Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) 'Sexually violent predator' means any person who has been convicted of or
charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of
sexual violence, if not confined in a secure facility ...
(e) 'Sexually violent offense' means: . .. (2) indecent liberties with a child as
defined in KIS.A. § 21-3503 and amendments thereto.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1996).
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the Act violated his constitutional rights. 5
At an evidentiary hearing required by the Act, 6 the court found
probable cause to believe that Hendricks was a sexually violent
predator, but declined to address his constitutional claims.7 The
court ordered Hendricks to undergo a psychiatric evaluation at the
Lamed State Security Hospital8 and subsequently granted his
request for a jury trialY
During the two-day trial, the State offered undisputed evidence
establishing Hendricks' long history of violent sexual conduct. 10 The
State asserted that Hendricks, who was then sixty years old, had
spent more than twenty years in either prison or psychiatric
institutions for sexually-related offenses." In addition, Hendricks
had a criminal record revealing multiple convictions for violent
sexual acts, i.e., separate convictions for indecent liberties with a
child: 1960 (Spokane, Washington), 1963 and 1967 (Seattle,
Washington), and 1984 (Sedgwick, Kansas). 12 Dr. Charles Befort, the
chief psychologist for Lamed State Security Hospital, diagnosed
Hendricks as suffering from "pedophilia."' 3 Considering Hendricks'
past behavior in conjunction with a recent psychological
evaluation, Dr. Befort predicted that Hendricks would commit
future acts of sexual predation if released.' 4 The defense called a
5.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078. Hendricks also claimed that the State's petition
failed to show that he was a sexually violent predator. Further, he asserted that service of
the petition was inadequate. Finally, he claimed that the petition contravened a plea
agreement regarding his 1984 conviction. Care and Treatment of Hendrcks, 912 P.2d at 130.
6.
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a05 (1996).
7.
Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130.
8.
Id. Hendricks initially refused to undergo psychiatric evaluation, but was later
compelled to do so by the court. Id.
9. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06 (1996).
10.
Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131.
11. Id. at 130-31.
12.
Id. at 130. In 1960, Hendricks molested two young boys and was imprisoned for
three years; in 1963, he molested a seven-year-old girl and was imprisoned for two years; and
in 1967, he performed sexual acts with a young boy and girl and was imprisoned for five
years. This list does not include convictions for indecent exposure in 1955, lewdness in 1957,
or the molestation of his stepdaughter and stepson which continued from 1972 until his
indictment in 1984. Id. at 143.
13.
Id. at 137-38. "Pedophilia" is characterized as "preferential sexual activity with
children either in fantasy or in actuality." IIICOMPREHENSiVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1778

(Harold Kaplan, M.D., Alfred Freedman, M.D. & Benjamin Sadock, M.D. eds., 3d ed. 1983).
Dr. Befort testified that pedophilia is not a "personality disorder," but a "mental abnormality."
Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138. He further stated that the term "mental
abnormality" is a "phrase used by clinicians to discuss abnormality or deviance, but that it is
not a diagnosis." Id.
14.
Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131. Dr. Befort based his conclusion
on his experience that past behavior is a reasonably accurate predictor of future acts,
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forensic psychiatrist, Dr. William Logan, who opined that
psychiatrists cannot reasonably predict the future conduct of sex
offenders based upon their prior acts. 5 Despite this conflicting
testimony, Hendricks himself admitted at trial that he could not
control his desire to perform sexual acts with children when he
was "stressed out.'

6

Based upon this evidence, the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator.17 The court
denied both Hendricks' motion to dismiss and motion for new
trial 8 and ordered him to be placed into the custody of the
Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services ("SRS"). Hendricks
appealed the jury verdict and custodial order to the Kansas
Supreme Court, alleging that the Act abridged his rights under the
2
20
19
substantive Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto '

22
Clauses of the United States Constitution.
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the Act violated
Hendricks' substantive due process rights, but did not rule on
Hendricks' double jeopardy or ex post facto claims. 23 The court
first considered two United States Supreme Court cases, Addington
v. Texas24 and Foucha v. Louisiana,5 to determine whether the Act

especially regarding pedophiles. Id.
15. Id. at 144. Dr. Logan based his opinion on "various studies" and "current medical
knowledge." Id.
16. Id. at 131.
17. Id. KAN. STAT. ANN., section 59-29a07, provides, in part: "(a) The court or jury shall
determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator."
Beyond a reasonable doubt is defined as "fully satisfied, entirely convinced, satisfied to a
moral certainty." BLACK's LAw DicriONARY 111 (6th ed. 1990).
18.
Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131. Hendricks argued in support of
his motion to dismiss that the State did not have an appropriate treatment program in place
at the time of the verdict. Id.
19.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." Id.
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. "[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Id.
21. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10. "[N]o State shall. . . pass any. . . ex post facto law..
Id.
22. Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P2d at 133.
23. Id. at 138.
24.
441 U.S. 418 (1979). The court cited Addington for the proposition that, in the
context of civil confinement, the law requires a clear and convincing evidentiary standard
when determining whether an individual is mentally ill and/or dangerous. Care and
Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 134.
25.
504 U.S. 71 (1992). The court cited Foucha for the proposition that the State
cannot override an individual's interest in being free from confinement if based upon a
showing of future dangerousness due to a "personality disorder," as opposed to mental
illness. Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 134.
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met due process requirements for civil commitment.2 6 Based upon
these decisions, the court concluded that the State must prove by
clear and convincing evidence 27 that the individual sought to be
confined is mentally ill and dangerous to himself or the public.2 29
Second, the court emphasized the decision in Young v. Weston,
which concerned a sexually violent predator statute enacted by the
state of Washington. 30 The statute in Young was deemed invalid
under the Due Process Clause because it did not require that the
offender suffer from mental illness, but rather based confinement
3
on a "mental abnormality." '
After outlining the law of these sister jurisdictions as stated
above, the court performed a two-part analysis, considering
whether the Act, itself, or evidence presented by the State satisfied
the mental illness requirement.3 2 It concluded neither satisfied the
requirement.3 The court rejected the Act because it found that the
primary objective of the Act was incarceration, evidenced by
language indicating that a sexually violent predator would not
respond to treatment" and the fact that treatment was delayed
until after the prisoner's release. 35 The State's evidence failed
because Dr. Befort testified that a "mental abnormality" is not a
psychiatric diagnosis.3 6 Neither the American Psychiatric
26. Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 134.
27. Clear and convincing proof is defined as "[tihat proof which results in reasonable
certainty of the truth of the ultimate fact in controversy. Proof which requires more than a
preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." BLACK'S LAW
DicnoNARY 172 (6th ed. 1990).
28. Id. at 135.
898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
29.
Young, 898 F Supp. at 746-48. The Washington and Kansas statutes are virtually
30.
identical. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 - 902 (1992) and KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 - 17
(1996).
31.
Young, 898 F. Supp. at 750-53.
Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136-37.
32.
33.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 136. The language to which the court specifically refers is part of the
34.
legislative findings of the Act and reads as follows:
In contrast to persons appropriate for civil commitment under K.S.A. § 59-2901 et seq.
and amendments thereto, sexually violent predators generally have antisocial
personality features which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment
modalities and those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent
behavior.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1996).
Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136. The Act provides that the
35.
appropriate agency must give notice to the attorney general 90 days prior to the release of a
potential sexually violent predator. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1996).
36. Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 137-38.
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Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders37 nor the Kansas general civil confinement statute defines
"mental abnormality."38 Thus, the court held that the Act was
unconstitutional because it did not require that Hendricks suffer
39
from mental illness before imposing forcible civil confinement.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
review the Kansas decision and to review Hendricks' double
jeopardy and ex post facto claims. 40 Justice Thomas, writing for a
majority of five justices, 41 found that the right to be free from
confinement is unquestionably "at the core of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause." 42 The Supreme Court has recognized,
however, that, in certain situations, a State's interest in protecting
the public can outweigh an individual's right to be free from
confinement. 43
The Court performed a strict scrutiny44 analysis to determine
whether the Act was sufficiently narrowly tailored to accomplish
the State's compelling interest in keeping uncontrollably dangerous
persons from interacting with the public.45 Under the rationale of
Foucha, the Court found that this State objective remains within
constitutional limits when the statute requires both a showing of
dangerousness and mental illness. 46 The Court ruled that the Act
47
met both requirements.
In explaining this ruling, the Court reasoned that the Act ensures
the element of dangerousness because it only applies to persons
who have been convicted of, or charged with, a sexually violent
offense. 48 The Act also ensures the existence of a mental illness
because it requires that the offender exhibit a "mental abnormality
37.
3d ed. rev. (1987).
38.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2092(h) (1996).
39.
Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
40.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1997). Kansas filed a petition for
certiorari on the state supreme court decision - Hendricks filed a cross-petition regarding
his double jeopardy and ex post facto claims. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076.
41.
The majority consisted of Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and a
separate concurrence by Justice Kennedy. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices
Stevens and Souter and joined, in part, by Justice Ginsburg.
42. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
43. Id. at 2079-80.
44. The Supreme Court has held that statutory provisions will survive strict scrutiny
analysis "only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
45. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079-80.
46. Id. at 2080.
47. Id. at 2079-80.
48. Id. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1996).
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or personality disorder."49 Contrary to the view of the Kansas
Supreme Court, the Court does not require that the statutory
language correspond with terms used by psychiatrists. 5° Instead, the
Court focused on whether the individual can control his behavior.51
These two provisions taken together, narrowly limit the scope of
the statute to include only those persons who are dangerous and
lack the ability to control their dangerous tendencies. 52
Hendricks had a long history of convictions for sexually violent
offenses and had been diagnosed as suffering from pedophilia,
which is a condition falling under the category of "mental
abnormality."53 Thus, the Court concluded that the Act did not
abridge Hendricks' substantive due process rights.
The Court also explored whether the Act contravened the Double
Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses. These constitutional provisions
primarily apply to criminal matters. 54 Therefore, the Court first
examined whether the Act was criminal or civil in nature. 55 For a
statute to be a civil law, the State must "disavow punitive intent."56
After considering a number of factors, the Court determined that
57
the Act ultimately serves the goals of the civil law.

The Court found that the Kansas legislature intended to enact a
civil law because the Act is contained in a civil statute - the
49. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1996).
50. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081.
51. Id. at 2078. As evidenced by his own testimony, Hendricks was unable to control
his behavior. Id.
52. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
53. Id. at 2080. Kansas alleged that Hendricks suffered from a "mental abnormality";
this term is described in the Act as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent
offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others."
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1996).
54.
Double Jeopardy protection shields an accused from:
(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, (2) a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for
the same offense. [citations omitted] . . . An ex post facto law punishes as a crime an
act previously committed that was innocent when done, increases the punishment for
a crime after its commission, or deprives an accused of any defense which was
available by law at the time the act was committed (citations omitted).
Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 153-54 (1996). Double Jeopardy protection
against "multiple punishments for the same offense" may be implicated in civil matters. This
occurs when a civil sanction is so disproportionate to the harm inflicted that it operates as
punishment. Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 154 (citing United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989)).
Id. at 2081-82.
55.
56. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085.
57.
Id.
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Kansas probate code.5 Next, the Court considered whether the
Act's objective is punishment by asking whether its provisions
legislate retribution or specific deterrence. 59 The Court concluded
that the Act's requirement of a prior conviction or charge of a
sexually violent offense merely demonstrates an individual's
immediate dangerousness. Such provision does not legislate
retribution for prior bad acts.60 Additionally, the Act's "mental
abnormality or personality disorder" provision only applies to
persons who cannot control their behavior.61 This provision focuses
on lack of self-control, not criminal intent. 62 Moreover, the Court
pointed out that incarceration is not an effective deterrent to such
persons.6
The Court then considered whether commitment under the Act
serves the purposes of protecting the public and providing
treatment. The Court found that the Act, by confining the offender
until he is no longer a danger to others, while offering treatment to
enable him to return to society, fulfills these objectives.64
Commitment not only separates the offender from society, but also
focuses on his illness and attempts to remedy that condition. 65 To
support this proposition further, the Court noted that commitment
is subject to yearly review and a jury's finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that the person remains a violent sexual predator.6
Therefore, the Court found that the primary purpose of the Act is
67
treatment, not punishment.
Thus, the Court held that the Kansas legislature intended to
enact a civil law; that the Act does not promote either retribution
or specific deterrence; and that the Act furthers the goals of public
safety and treatment.6 Moreover, because the Act is civil in nature,
it does not invoke the special rights afforded a criminal defendant
58. Id. at 2082.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2084.
65. Id. at 2084-85.
66. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083. The court stated: "That Kansas chose to afford such
procedural protections does not transform a civil commitment proceeding into a criminal
prosecution." Id.
67. Id. at 2083. Whether or not treatment is available to Hendricks was not at issue. In
this case, "we have never held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining
those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others." Id.
68. Id. at 2085.
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under either the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses. 69
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with the
majority that the Act is narrowly tailored to accomplish the
compelling state interest of protecting potential victims from
uncontrollably dangerous sex offenders. 70 He advised, however,
against employing civil confinement statutes to achieve the goals of
7
criminal law, specifically, retribution and general deterrence. '
Justice Breyer, in dissent, 72 also agreed with the majority
regarding Hendricks' due process claim.73 Like the majority, he
opined that a State may impose forcible civil confinement upon
dangerous persons. He based his opinion, however, on the fact that
psychiatrists recognize pedophilia as a "serious mental disorder."74
The gravamen of this condition is loss of self-control, making
Hendricks a danger to young children. 75 For these reasons, the
dissent found that the Act, as applied to Hendricks, adequately met
the "mentally ill" and "dangerous" requirements set forth in
76
Foucha.
The dissent maintained that the Act contravenes the Double
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses because it legislates
punishment rather than treatment. 77 Justice Breyer articulated four
arguments to support the proposition that the Act is a criminal, not
a civil, law.78 The dissent asserted that the main purpose of the Act
is incarceration, a primary goal of the criminal law. 79 Such
incarceration is carried out in a manner similar to that of the
criminal law; the Act provides for stringent procedural safeguards
and only applies to persons who have been convicted or charged
with a criminal offense8 1
Justice Breyer argued that the purpose of commitment under the
69.
Id. at 2085-86. "Our conclusion that the Act is nonpunitive thus removes an
essential prerequisite for both Hendricks' double jeopardy and ex post facto claims." Id. at
2085.
70. Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71.
Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72. Justice Breyer was joined in dissent by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
73. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74.
Id. See, e.g., AMEmCAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSN., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 524-25, 527-28 (4th ed. 1994).
75. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2089 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2090-95 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Act is punishment 8 1 He supported this proposition by finding that
the statute provides for treatment only after the offender has
completed his prison sentence.8 2 Such delay, in Justice Breyer's
opinion, does not facilitate recovery because it distances the
offender from the conduct that the State allegedly intended to
treat. 83 In addition, he fervently emphasized that, even though
treatment was available to Hendricks, the State did not provide
treatment while he was in the custody of SRS.84 This fact indicated
to the dissent that the true intent of the Act is to punish, not to
treat.85 Further, the Act does not require consideration of less
restrictive alternatives.86 Justice Breyer concluded that, unlike civil
commitment statutes enacted by other states, the Kansas Act
applies to persons who have already been convicted of a prior
sexually violent offense, delays treatment, and fails to consider less
87
restrictive alternatives.
Legislation specifically addressing sexually motivated crimes first
appeared in the late 1930's.88 State legislatures enacted these laws
in response to public outrage against highly publicized, brutal sex
crimes. 89 These early laws were premised on the idea that offenders
would improve with treatment. 90 The popularity of sexual
psychopathic statutes, as they came to be known, grew, and by
1960, twenty-six states (including Kansas) had adopted some form
of the statute.9 1 The former Kansas act provided for civil
81. Id. at 2091-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82.
Id. at 2091 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Notice must be given to the state attorney
general within 90 days of release from prison. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1996).
83.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2094 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer argued that delays in
treatment are especially harmful since the legislature has recognized that such individuals
require long-term treatment Id.
84.
Id. at 2093 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In fact, Kansas had neither allocated funds nor
secured contracts for a staff qualified to treat Hendricks' condition. Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 2094 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87.
Id. at 2095 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88. The first statute was enacted by Michigan in 1937. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 780.501-.509
(Callaghan 1937). (Repealed by PA. 1966, No. 267, § 2, eff. Mar. 10, 1967; PA 1968, No. 143,
§ 2, eff. Aug. 1, 1968). Raquel Blacher, Comment: Historical Perspective of the "Sex
Psychopath" Statute: From the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46
MERCER L REv. 889, 897-98 n.76 (1996).
89.
Blacher, supra, at 900. At the time, "sex psychopath legislation appeared to have
been regarded as the means necessary to satisfy the 'urgency' resulting from public hysteria
and sensationalism." Id.
90. Id. at 897-901. Most statutes provided for confinement until the offender recovered
or, in the alternative, was no longer a threat to society. Id. at 898-99.
91.
Id. at 902. Many contained some or all of the following provisions: proceedings
initiated by District Attorneys; offender charged with, or convicted of, a crime; offender
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commitment of sex offenders in lieu of a criminal sentence.92
Attitudes toward the rehabilitation of sex offenders began to
change in the early 1980's. It was no longer believed that such
persons would respond to treatment or even suffered from mental
illness.93 Thus, many states began to repeal their sexual
psychopathic statutes. 94
Recently, there has been a resurgence of involuntary civil
commitment statutes known as sexually violent predator acts. As in
the past, these acts surfaced in response to heinous sexual crimes
broadcast by the media 95 In addition, modem legislators have
taken an innovative approach to this enduring social problem
through registration and notification statutes like New Jersey's
Megan's Law.96 Unlike the Kansas Act, Megan's Law requires
persons convicted of a sex offense to register with the Department
of Corrections upon their release from prison.97 In E.B. v.
Verniero,98 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
recently upheld due process, double jeopardy and ex post facto
challenges to Megan's Law.99 The Supreme Court of the United
States denied certiorari. 0 0 For the reasons discussed below and
especially in light of the Court's decision in Hendricks, the lesser
constraint on personal liberty mandated by Megan's Law would
lacked ability to control sexual behavior; compulsory medical examination performed; and
pre-commitment hearing held. Id. at 903-05..
Act of Apr. 2, 1953, ch. 186, 1953 Kan. Sess. Laws 334 (repealed 1970). The
92.
current Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Statute differs, however, in that it provides for
commitment subsequent to a criminal sentence. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1996).
93.
Blacher, supra note 88, at 906-07.
Id. at 907. At least thirteen states repealed their sexual psychopathic statutes;
94.
among those still in force, only five states actually employ them. Id.
95.
Washington State's Sexually Violent Predator Statute was enacted after the rape
and sexual mutilation of a seven-year old boy by a repeat sex offender. Blacher, supra note
88, at 909. This incident was the last of a trilogy of violent crimes that occurred in late 1988.
Id. at 907-08. Kansas State's Sexual Violent Predator Statute was enacted after the murder,
rape, and sodomy of a twenty-year-old woman by a man who had just been released from
prison after being incarcerated for conmitting a similar crime. Clayton C. Skaggs, Kansas'
Sexual PredatorAct and the Impact of Expert Predictions:Psyched Out by the Daubert Test,
34 WASHBURN L J. 320, 320 (1995). New Jersey's Registration and Notification of Release of
Certain Offenders provision ("Megan's Law") was enacted by an overwhelming public
response after the murder, rape, and strangulation of a seven-year old girl by a
twice-convicted child molester. Blacher, supra note 88, at 915.
96. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 7-2 (West 1998). New Jersey's law has been codified in the
Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 170101, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
97. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 7-2(a) (West 1998).
98.
119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
99. E.B., 119 F.3d at 1111.
100. E.B. v. Vernero, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
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have withstood constitutional scrutiny had the Court decided those
issues.101
Early on, the United States Supreme Court held that both state
and federal governments could forcibly detain mentally ill persons
pursuant to their police powers. 10 2 In 1940, the Court upheld
Minnesota's "psychopathic personality" statute. 1°3 The petitioner in
Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County,'°4
challenged the statute on equal protection and due process
grounds. 0 5 The Court found that the involuntary commitment of
persons suffering from a "psychopathic personality" satisfies both
equal protection and due process considerations. 0 6 The Court
reasoned that the legislature had made a valid distinction between
general civil committees and those persons who "constitute a
dangerous element in the community."0 In addition, the Court held
that the statute upholds petitioner's due process rights if it provides
numerous procedural safeguards.10 8
A similar issue was addressed under federal law in Greenwood v.
United States. °9 Greenwood concerned a federal statute that
provided for the involuntary commitment of persons accused of a
federal crime, but who were incompetent to stand trial. 10 The
101.
Unlike registration, "lawmakers have found the involuntary civil provision to be
'at the cutting edge' for federal law." Blacher, supra note 88, at 918.
102.
The State's ability to impose forcible civil commitment originates from either its
parens patriae or police powers. Parenspatriae ("parent of the country") enables the state
to provide care and treatment for persons who, because of mental illness or other reasons,
cannot take care of themselves. BLACK's LAw DMTIONARY 769 (6th ed. 1990). Police power, on
the other hand, permits a state to forcibly detain dangerously mentally ill persons for the
protection of the general population. Deborah L. Morris, ConstitutionalImplications of the
Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators - A Due Process Analysis, 82
CORNELL L REv. 594, 624-27 (1997).
103. The statute's application was limited to:
any person of such condition of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or
lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the
consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such
person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby
dangerous to other persons.
Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270, 272 (1940).
104.
309 U.S. 270 (1940).
105.
Minnesota ex rel. Pearson,309 U.S. at 272.
106.
Id. at 274-75.
107. Id. at 275. "As we have often said, the legislature is free to recognize degrees of
harm, and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed
to be clearest." Id.
108.
Id. at 275-76. These safeguards may include pre-commitment hearings, right to
counsel, and examination by two qualified physicians.
109.
350 U.S. 366 (1956).
110.
Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 367-69; 18 U.S.C. § 4244 entitled, "Hospitalization of a
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question before the Court was whether the statute applied to an
individual suffering from an enduring mental illness,' and, if so,
whether Congress had the power to legislate indefinite forcible civil
commitment.1 2 Relying on a report of the Committee of the
Judicial Conference," 3 the Court determined that Congress drafted
the statute to include persons suffering from long-term mental
disorders." 4 Despite acknowledging the uncertainty of psychiatric
diagnosis, 115 the Court found sufficient evidence to demonstrate
that Mr. Greenwood was incompetent and upheld his detention.116
Finally, the Court held that the statute fell within Congressional
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause." 7 Thus, the
decisions of Minnesota ex rel. Pearson and Greenwood establish
the power of both state and federal authorities to detain civilly the
dangerously mentally ill.
convicted person suffering from mental disease or defect." The Court held that persons
committed prior to conviction under section 4244 are subject to release under section 4248.
Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 374. Section 4248 provides:
commitment shall run until the sanity or mental competency of the person shall be
restored or until the mental condition of the person is so improved that if he be
released he will not endanger the safety of the officers, the property, or other
interests of the United States....
Id. at 376. "Section, [4248] added Sept. 7, 1949, c. 535, § 1, 63 Stat. 686, which related to the
termination of custody by release or transfer, was omitted in the general amendment of this
chapter by Pub. L 98-473, Title 11, c. IV, § 403(a), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2057." 18 U.S.C.
§ 4248 ("Historical and Statutory Notes") (1997).
111.
Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 373. The petitioner, Earl P. Greenwood, was certified as
legally insane. Id. The Court found that his "prognosis for recovery appears to be poor and
that he will probably require indefinite hospitalization to insure his own safety and that of
society." Id. at 372.
112.
Id. at 373-75.
113. Id. at 373.
114.
Id. at 373-74. The relevant portions of the report read in part:
If the accused's mental disability appears not to be a transitory condition, but in all
likelihood he will, because of his insanity, never be brought to trial, it would seem
that as a general rule the federal government should not assume responsibility for his
hospitalization....
But there may be cases where the accused's domicile cannot be satisfactorily
established and where no state will assume responsibility for his care.. . . Obviously
in such a case there should be authority in the court to cause the confinement of the
accused in a mental hospital.
Id.
115.
Id. at 375. "The only certain thing that can be said about the present state of
knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not reached finality of
judgment, even about a situation as unpromising as petitioner's...." Id.
116.
Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 375-76.
117.
Id. at 375. The Necessary and Proper Clause states: "To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution.. . ." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Once the Court recognized that a general police power to
commit dangerously mentally ill persons existed, a further question
arose - whether the insane and dangerously insane were similarly
situated persons pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. This
issue was first addressed in Baxtrom v. Herold.n8 Baxtrom
explored whether a New York statute providing for involuntary civil
commitment following imprisonment violated the Equal Protection
Clause by failing to require jury review, a procedure that was
available in all other civil commitment circumstances.1 9 The Court
held that persons civilly committed under the statute should be
afforded the same procedural safeguards as all other civil
committees. 120 This conclusion was based upon the following
premise: "Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or
dangerously insane . . may be a reasonable distinction for
purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical care to be
given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the
12
opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all." '
Thus, the Court concluded that all civil committees are similarly
situated regarding the procedures by which the State may initiate
22
confinement. 1
The Court later expanded the holding in Baxtrom to include
procedural safeguards for renewal of commitment. In Humphrey v.
0. Cady,'23 the petitioner challenged the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act
("SCA7) 24 on the basis that, unlike the State's general civil
commitment scheme, 125 SCA provided for five-year renewals
without requiring a jury to determine that petitioner continued to
suffer from mental illness. 26 The Court reasoned that because
renewal orders "are based upon new findings of fact [i.e.,
petitioner's continued mental illness], and are in no way limited by
118.
383 U.S. 107 (1966).
119. Baxtrom, 383 U.S. at 110-12.
120. Id. at 110.
121.
Id. at 111. The Court continued, "there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing
the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil
commitments." Id. at 111-12.
122.
Id. at 111-12.
123.
405 U.S. 504 (1972).
124.
WIs. STAT. § 975.01- 18 (1971). A prerequisite for commitment under the Act is the
commission of a crime "probably directly motivated by a desire for sexual excitement." A
renewal order may be obtained upon a showing that release would be "dangerous to the
public because of [his] mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality." Humphrey,
405 U.S. at 507.
125.
Wis. STAT. § 51.01- 95 (1957).
126. Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 508-510.
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the nature of [petitioner's] crime or the maximum sentence
authorized for that crime," 27 petitioner, like all other civil
128
committees should be afforded the same procedural safeguards.
Equal protection, therefore, requires that statutes providing for
involuntary civil commitment of the dangerously insane must offer
the same initial and continuing commitment procedures as those
available under general detention schemes.
After the Court established that all civil committees were entitled
to the same procedural standards, subsequent case law raised due
process questions as to what those standards should be. In Jackson
v. Indiana,129 the state declared a mentally deficient deaf mute
incompetent to stand trial, confining him until he could regain his
sanity. 130 The Court struck down petitioner's confinement under due
process because there was little hope of petitioner's ability ever to
attain competence to stand trial.' 31 The record was also devoid of
any evidence showing that he was dangerous 32 or in need of
custodial care.'3 In short, the Court required that the "nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which [Jackson was] commintted."'3
Three years after Jackson, the Court ruled against a Florida state
mental hospital for refusing to release a non-dangerous mentally ill
person.'3 5 O'Connor recognized that due process prevents a state
from involuntarily confining a non-dangerous mentally ill person for
the sole purpose of treatment.' 36 Restraint of such a person who
can take care of himself is not a valid exercise of the state's parens
patriae power. 37 Taken together, Jackson and O'Connor point to
the conclusion that a state must have a rational basis connected
127.
Id. at 511.
128. Id. at 512. The Court remanded the case to the district court to make a factual
determination regarding Humphrey's equal protection claim and his recommitment under the
Wisconsin SCA. Id. at 512-13.
129.
406 U.S. 715 (1972).
130. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 719.
131.
Id. at 718. The Court paraphrased one physician's testimony: "[Elven if Jackson
were not a deaf mute, he would be incompetent to stand trial, and doubted whether
petitioner had sufficient intelligence ever to develop the necessary communication skills." Id.
132.
Id. at 728. Jackson was convicted of stealing money from two women on
separate occasions (for four dollars and five dollars, respectively). Id. at 717.
133.
Id.
134.
Id. at 738.
135.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
136.
O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575-76. Donaldson, who was initially confined because he
was allegedly experiencing delusions, remained in confinement for almost fifteen years. Id.
at 566-67.
137.
Id. at 575.
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either to its police or parens patriaepower to detain the mentally
ill.
In Addington v. Texas, 138 the Court determined that the "clear
and convincing" rather than "beyond a reasonable doubt"
evidentiary standard applies to all civil commitment proceedings. 139
The petitioner in Addington asserted that procedural due process
required a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he was mentally
ill before the State could involuntarily confine him. 140 In balancing
petitioner's liberty interest against the State's parens patriae and
police powers,' 4 ' the Court adopted an intermediate standard. 42
The Court rejected the more lenient "preponderance" standard
because of the strong_ personal liberty interest at stake.'"
Conversely, the majority rejected the stringent "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard because of the non-empirical nature of
psychiatric evaluation.'4
Refining the concepts developed in Jackson and O'Connor, the
Court's decisions in Jones v. United States4 5 and Foucha v.
Louisiana46 further delineate the requirements for imposing
forcible civil confinement. The Jones Court examined whether due
process was offended when an insanity acquittee is required to
spend a longer period in a mental hospital than he would have
served in prison. 47 The Court first explored whether "a finding of
not guilty by reason of insanity is a sufficient foundation for
commitment of an insanity acquittee for the purposes of treatment
and the protection of society."'4 "Not guilty by reason of insanity"
means that the defendant committed a crime and would not have
138.
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
139. Addington, 441 U.S. at 431.
140. Id. at 421-22.
141.
Id. at 426. The Court reasoned, "[TIhe state has a legitimate interest under its
parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional
disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to
protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill." Id.
142. Id. at 425.
143. Id. at 427. "Loss of liberty calls for something more serious than is demonstrated
by idiosyncratic behavior." Id.
144. Addington, 441 U.S. at 429. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
145.
463 U.S. 354 (1983).
146.
504 U.S. 71 (1992).
147. Jones, 463 U.S. at 356. Jones was charged with attempting to steal clothing from
a department store. The maximum prison sentence for this crime was one year. At the time
the suit was brought, Jones had spent well over one year at St Elizabeth's Hospital for the
mentally ill. Id. at 359-60.
148. Id. at 366.
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done so but for the presence of an underlying mental problem. 4 9
These elements establish that the defendant was dangerous
because he committed a crime and was suffering from a mental
illness.'w A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity satisfies these
two elements; thus, the Court determined that such a verdict
justified petitioner's confinement.' 5 '
The Court held that the length of civil commitment need not
equal the length of a prison sentence. 52 This reasoning was based
upon differing public policies underlying both civil and criminal
incarceration.'15 The length of petitioner's civil commitment "rest[s]
on his continuing illness and dangerousness,"'1 but the length of a
prison sentence "reflect[s] society's view of the proper response to
commission of a particular criminal offense based on a variety of
considerations such as retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation." 1'
Thus, the Jones opinion is significant because it enunciates the
requirements of both dangerousness and mental illness and clearly
distinguishes between the goals of civil and criminal law regarding
civil commitment of the criminally insane.
Foucha addressed whether the state of Louisiana could continue
to confine an insanity acquittee suffering from an "antisocial
personality " "' disorder solely on the basis that he might be
dangerous, if released. 157 Due to the important personal liberty
interest at risk, the Court held that the State cannot perpetuate an
individual's confinement without establishing that he continues to
be both dangerous and mentally ill.'5 The Court determined that
149.
Id. at 363.
150. Id. at 364-66.
151.
Id. at 366.
152.
Jones, 463 U.S. at 369.
153.
Id. at 368-69.
154.
Id. at 369.
155.
Id. at 368-69.
156.
A person suffering from a "personality disorder" exhibits the following three
characteristics: "an inflexible and maladaptive response to stress... a disability in working
and loving that is generally more serious and always more pervasive than that found in
neurosis . . . [and] a peculiar capacity to get under the skin of others." I COMPREHENSIVE
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHMATRY 1563 (Harold Kaplan, M.D., Alfred Freedman, M.D. & Benjamin
Sadock, M.D. eds., 3d ed. 1983).
157.
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78. Foucha committed aggravated burglary and illegal
discharge of a weapon. After he had spent four years at the East Feliciana [Parish] Forensic
Facility, a court-appointed sanity commission denied his release on the grounds that they
"[could] not certify that [Foucha] would not constitute a menace to himself or others if
released." Id. at 73-75.
158. Id. One doctor testified that at the time he committed the offense, Foucha was
experiencing a "drug induced psychosis" and since that time had not exhibited any "signs of

1998

Kansas v. Hendricks

Louisiana had not satisfied either of these requirements'5 9 and
ordered Foucha's release.' 6° In addition, the Court found that the
Louisiana commitment statute did not provide adequate procedural
16
safeguards to demonstrate a lack of mental capacity. '
Together, Jones and Foucha establish that a state civil
commitment scheme must require a showing of both dangerousness
and mental illness. Under Jones, a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity may meet these requirements for initial commitment. 6 2
Due process demands, however, that the State implement
procedures to ensure that the committee continues to pose a threat
to society and suffer from a mental disorder.1'
A nuance to the developing due process formula was added by
the decision in United States v. Salerno.'64 Salerno considered
whether defendants could be forcibly detained prior to trial
pursuant to the Bail Reform Act. 1 The statute authorized detention
solely upon a determination that defendants were a danger to the
public. 66 The Bail Reform Act passed constitutional muster as a
legitimate use of State police power because it was narrowly
67
tailored to apply to a small select group of persons.'
psychosis or neurosis and was in 'good shape' mentally." Id. at 75.
159.
Id. at 85-86. Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence that a state may confine
an insanity acquittee who has regained his mental faculties if there exists an overriding
public safety concern. Id. at 87-88. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 82. "Here, . . . the State asserts that because Foucha once committed a
criminal act and now has an antisocial personality that sometimes leads to aggressive
conduct, a disorder for which there is no effective treatment, he may be held indefinitely."
Id.
161.
Id. at 79. There were no procedures in place to determine whether Foucha
continued to suffer from mental illness. In fact, the statute placed the burden of proving
sufficient mental capacity on Foucha. Id. at 75.
162.
Jones, 463 U.S. at 366.
163. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78-83.
164.
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
165.
18 U.S.C. § 3141- 3160 (1982 ed., Supp. Il); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 743.
166.
Sa/eino, 481 U.S. at 742. The relevant part of the Bail Reform Act provides: "[I]f,
after a hearing... , the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community, he shall order the detention of the person prior to trial."-Id.
(citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e)). Anthony Salerno and Vmcent Cafaro were members of the
Genovese family, known to use violence in furtherance of its illegal activities. Id. at 743.
167. Id. at 749-50. The Court continued:
The right to be free from confinement may, in circumstances where the government's
interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of society. We
think that Congress' careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention
will be permitted satisfies this standard. When the Government proves by clear and
convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an
individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause,
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In addition to equal protection and due process concerns,
subsequent cases raised the issue of whether such civil
commitment statutes invoked the special constitutional rights
associated with criminal prosecution. The petitioner in A//en v.
Illinois'ss asserted that the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act'6 9 was a criminal law and attempted to enforce his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.1 70 The Court disagreed,
ultimately holding that the Act is a civil law for Fifth Amendment
purposes.' In determining whether a statutory scheme is civil or
criminal in nature, the Court offered the following guidelines:
determine legislative intent; 72 review conmitment procedures (the
presence of procedural safeguards associated with a criminal law
does not make the statute criminal per se); 73 consider legislative
174
purpose; and/or whether the state has repudiated punishment.
The United States Supreme Court correctly decided that the Act
falls within the constitutional limits prescribed by the Due Process,
Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto Clauses. In order for a State
to civilly commit a person based upon a criminal charge or
conviction, due process requires .that the State present "clear and
convincing evidence" 75 that such person is both dangerous and
a court may disable the arrestee from executing that threat.
Id. at 750-51.
168.
478 U.S. 364 (1986).
169. Allen, 478 U.S. at 365. "Sexually dangerous persons" as defined under the Illinois
Act are:
All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has existed for a
period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the filing of the petition
hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex
offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or
acts of sexual molestation of children, are hereby declared sexually dangerous
persons.
Id. at 366 n. 1 (quoting ILL REV. STAT., ch. 38,
105-1.01(1985)).
170.
Allen, 478 U.S. at 368. Allen asserted that because application of the Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act was a criminal proceeding, he was not required to answer questions
posed by psychiatrists during a competency evaluation. Id. at 366.
171.
Id. at 375.
172.
Id. at 368. The Illinois legislature expressly declared that the statute "'shall be
civil in nature.'" Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38,
105-3.01(1985)).
173. Id. at 371-72. The Court noted that "antecedent conduct is received not to punish
past misdeeds, but primarily to show the accused's mental condition and to predict future
behavior." Id.
174.
Id. at 372-74. The Court emphasized the fact that Allen received treatment while
in custody and indicated that the decision might have been decided differently "[hiad [he]
shown, for example, that [his] confinement [was] essentially identical to that imposed upon
felons with no need for psychiatric care." Id. at 373.
175.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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suffers from a mental illness. 176 In addition, the civil commitment
scheme must also provide for periodic review to ensure that the
detainee continues to meet the criteria of dangerousness and
mental illness. 177 The Act clearly satisfies these requirements.
The Act establishes dangerousness by relying upon prior sexually
violent criminal conduct. 7 8 It also defines mental illness by
requiring that the committee suffer from a "mental abnormality or
personality disorder."179 Both of these factors must be determined
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.'8 0 The Act provides for a
yearly jury determination, again beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the committee continues to remain a sexually violent predator.
These provisions squarely place the Act within the due process
standards previously developed by the Court.
The Court was also correct in disregarding the Kansas Supreme
Court's demand for a clinical definition of "mental illness" under
the Act. The Court has historically declined to adopt a bright line
definition of mental illness.1 8' As a threshold matter, the Court has
held that a State could not, pursuant to its police power, civilly
commit someone exhibiting idiosyncratic behavior18 2 or an
antisocial personality. '1
Pedophilia and other predatory deviant sexual conditions
described by the Act may not be classified as a mental illness by
psychiatrists, but such behavior goes beyond mere idiosyncratic
behavior. Persons suffering from these conditions are predisposed
to very specific quantifiable acts of violence, as opposed to persons
who exhibit general tendencies to commit violence. The State has
an established right under its police power to protect its citizenry
by detaining persons who, because of a mental condition, pose a
very real threat to a targeted segment of society.'8 4
Also, the Supreme Court has held that a civil commitment statute
176.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
177. Humphrey v. O'Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
178.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1996). A finding of violent criminal conduct differs
from the statute at issue in Jackson. There, the Court invalidated the long-term restraint of
Mr. Jackson who was convicted of robbery and larceny. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 717
(1972).
179.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1996).
180.

181.
182.
peculiarity
DICToNARY
183.
184.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1996).

See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956).
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979). Idiosyncrasy is defined as "a
of physical or mental constitution or temperament." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
(3d ed. 1986).
See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1991).
Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
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need only bear a reasonable relationship to either the state police
or parens patriae powers. 18 Taking into consideration, however,
the strong liberty interest at stake, the Court applied a strict
scrutiny analysis and found that, even under this most stringent
test, the Act still passes constitutional muster.
The second issue decided by the Court concerned whether the
Act is a criminal law, thereby invoking the Double Jeopardy and Ex
Post Facto Clauses. After considering each guideline set forth in
Allen v. Ilinois,l86 the Court rightly held that the Kansas Act is
civil in nature. The Kansas legislature presumptively intended to
enact a civil law by including the Act in the Kansas probate code.
In addition, the presence of a stringent (beyond a reasonable
doubt) evidentiary standard does not raise a presumption that the
Act is criminal. Yearly review of mental status and implementation
of treatment programs also indicate that the State disavows any
interest in punishing sexually violent predators under the
provisions of the Act. These provisions focus on the offender's
condition rather than his conduct.
For this reason, Justice Breyer's dissent is misdirected. Whether
the Act contains a treatment provision is not dispositive as to the
issue of legislative intent. The State may, pursuant to a legitimate
exercise of its police power, prescribe civil commitment for the
protection of its citizens. 18 7 Treatment is only essential for a State
to act under its parens patriae power. Thus, the placement and
construction of the Act supports a strong argument that the Kansas
legislature intended to and, in fact, did enact a civil law. The Court
found that the Act was civil, and therefore, double jeopardy and ex
post facto principles do not apply.'s8
In sum, the Court's decision in this case places modern sexual
predator statutes on a firn basis. As Justice Breyer pointed out in
his dissent, the Kansas Act legislated the most severe consequences
for criminal defendants.189 Unlike sexual predator statutes enacted
by other states, the Kansas Act only applies to persons convicted
of, or charged with, a criminal offense. The Act delays treatment
until after the offender serves a prison term, and it does not
require employment of less restrictive alternatives. Thus, by
185.
(1975).
186.
187.
188.
189.

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
Allen, 478 U.S. 364, 368-74 (1986).
Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (1997).
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2095 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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upholding the Kansas Act, the Court has broadly interpreted the
terms under which a sexual predator may be civilly committed and
has unequivocally affirmed the statutes currently in force in other
states. In effect, this decision furnishes state legislatures with the
means to respond affirmatively to, and ideally end, the violence
perpetrated by sexual predators.
Jenine E. Elco

